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 Michael Dunne
 Richard FitzRalph of Dundalk (c. 1300-1360) and
 the New World1
 Richard FitzRalph was one of the most significant Irish authors of the
 medieval period. This article looks at his notion of dominium which concerned
 the problem of lordship or ownership over goods and people. Racial tensions
 within his own diocese of Armagh formed the context for his treatment of the
 theme. In particular he was concerned that some of his Anglo-Norman
 subjects justified the seizure of property belonging to their Gaelic neighbours
 by appealing to march law {lex marchie). FitzRalph sought a theory of property
 that would apply equally to all. In elaborating his system, which became influ
 ential in the West, the Irishman drew on a rich philosophical and theological
 tradition. While the term dominium had already been used by St Augustine, it
 was Peter Lombard who popularised it in the fourth book of the Sentences.
 This article examines FitzRalph's use of the term, his influence on John Wyclif
 and Francisco de Vitoria and the role of his thought in the sixteenth-century
 university disputes provoked by the discovery' of the New World.
 Fitzralph was born Richard Rauf at Dundalk around 1300 into an Anglo
 Norman family. Although his family were respectable they do not seem to have
 I This article is based upon a paper presented to the Faculty of Philosophy, National University of
 Ireland, Maynoot,ash in March 2003. I wish to thank my colleague, Prof. James McEvoy, for having
 read the paper and for his suggestions. The standard work on the life and career of FitzRalph is
 {Catherine Walsh, A fourteenth-century scholar and primate: Richard FitzRalph in Oxford, Avignon and
 Armagh (Oxford, 1981) and, by the same author, Archbishop Fitz-Ralph and the Friars at the Papal
 Court in Avignon, 1357-60' in Traditio 31 (1975) pp 223-45; Der Becket der Irisher Kirche:
 Der "Armachanus" Richard FitzRalph von Armagh (1"i36o). Professor, Kirchenfiirst, Heiliger' in
 Innsbrucker Historische Studien 20/21 (1999), pp 1-58; her article on FitzRalph in NewDNB. A more
 recent examination of FitzRalph's Irish background and education at Oxford is to be found in
 Michael Dunne, A fourteenth-century example of an Introitus Sententiarum at Oxford: Richard
 FitzRalph's Inaugural Speech in praise of the Sentences of Peter Lombard' in Medieval Studies
 [Toronto], 63 (2001), pp 1-29. A full list of surviving works, manuscripts and editions is to be found
 in R. Sharpe, A Handlist of Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland before 1540 (Turnhout, 1997) pp
 478-81. Still of relevance on FitzRalph's life and career are the following by A. Gwynn, S.J., 'The
 Black Death in Ireland' in Studies 24 (1935), pp 25-42; Archbishop FitzRalph and George of Hungary'
 in Studies 24 (1935), pp 558-72; 'Richard FitzRalph, Archbishop of Armagh in Studies 25 (1936), pp 81
 96; Archbishop FitzRalph and the Friars' in Studies 26 (1937), pp 50-67; 'The Sermon Diary of
 Richard FitzRalph' in Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy 44 (1937), section C, no. 1, pp 1-57; 'Two
 Sermons of Primate Richard Fitzralph preached before the Provincial Councils of Armagh on 7
 February 1352 and 5 February 1355' in Archivium Hibernicum XIV (1949) pp 50?65. Also useful are M. J.
 Haren, 'Richard FitzRalph and the Friars: the Intellectual Itinerary of a Curial Controversialist' in
 J. Hamesse (ed.), Roma, Magistra Mundi. Itineraria Culturae Medievalis. Melanges offerts au R L.E.
 Boyle (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1998), vol. 1, pp 349-67; G. Leff, Richard FitzRalph, Commentator of the
 Sentences. A Study in Theological Orthodoxy (Manchester, 1963).
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 been well off. It may have been desire to forget his lowly origins that led
 Richard to change his name, before 1325, to FitzRalph, inspired, perhaps, by an
 imagined or wished-for connection with the English family of that name. The
 details of his early life are sparse. He tells us that some relatives were members
 of the Franciscan order in Dundalk.2 It may be supposed that he received his
 elementary education at Dundalk, and since the Franciscan friary was the only
 religious house in the town, it may have been there that he went to school.
 The lack of a local university meant that students like FitzRalph had to
 travel abroad for higher education.3 There is evidence of Irish students, Gaelic
 as well as Norman, at Oxford, Paris and other centres.4 Oxford, however,
 remained the place of choice for most Irish student peripatetics. Firauf (as he is
 called by his contemporaries) came to Oxford as a secular student in arts,
 probably at the customary age of fifteen. He was a fellow of Balliol College by
 1322 when he incepted as a master in arts, having completed the seven liberal
 arts and the three philosophies (natural, moral and metaphysics).5 As a student
 in theology he seems to have gone to University Hall. FitzRalph was
 bachalarius in sacra pagina after August 1328 and he had completed his lectures
 on the Sentences before October 1329.6 At Paris from 1329-30, his inception as
 doctor seems to have taken place in the summer of 1331. He became chancellor
 of the University of Oxford in 1332.
 In 1335 FitzRalph was appointed dean of Lichfield and remained at
 Lichfield until 1346 when he was appointed archbishop of Armagh, being
 consecrated at Exeter Cathedral in 1347. He became one of the most out
 standing bishops of his time, producing a number of influential works
 including the Summa de quaestionibus Armenorum, De pauperie Salvatoris
 (c. 1350-6) (which would have such an influence on Wyclif) and Defensio
 Curatorum. He is best known to historians because of his anti-mendicant
 stance. After his death his tomb became a centre of pilgrimage. In the margin
 of a page from the manuscript of the Martyrologium Dungallense, now con
 served at the National Library in Brussels, the scribe copied the following verse
 in Middle English: 'Manny a mile have I gone/and manny did I walk/But
 neuer sawe a hollier man/than Richard of Dundalk'.7 There are a number of
 2 See Walsh, A fourteenth-century scholar and primate, p. I. 3 On the various attempts to found an
 Irish university, see Walsh, pp n?13. On the clerical traffic between Ireland and England at this time,
 see Virginia Davis 'Material relating to Irish clergy in England in the late Middle Ages' in Archivium
 Hibernicum LVI (2002), pp 7-50. 4 A century beforehand, Peter of Ireland had studied and travelled
 as far as Italy, where he held a chair at the University of Naples. His extant works have been edited.
 See M. Dunne (ed.) 'Magistri Petri de Ybernia, Expositio et Quaestiones in Aristotelis librum De
 longitudine et brevitate vitae' in Philosophes Medievaux XXX (Louvain-Paris, 1993); M. Dunne (ed.)
 'Magistri Petri de Ybernia, Expositio et Quaestiones in Peryermenias Aristotelis' in Philosophes
 Medievaux XXXIV (Louvain-Paris, 1996). See also James McEvoy 'Maitre Pierre d'Irlande, professeur in
 naturalibus a l'universite de Naples' in J. Follon and J. McEvoy (eds), Actualite de la pensee medievale
 (Louvain, 1994), pp 146-58. 5 See Walsh, A fourteenth-century scholar and primate, p. 5. 6 The
 present author is preparing a critical edition of FitzRalph's Lectura in Sententias Petri Lombardi for the
 Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi series of the British Academy. 7 Brussels, Bibl. Nat., MS 506, f.ii5r.
 See Walsh, A fourteenth-century scholar and primate, p. 2, note.
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 references to him in Middle English literature, particularly in moral tracts
 inspired by the Lollards. He is regarded as a saint by the Church of Ireland,
 which keeps his feast day on 7 June. There is a chapel dedicated to him in
 Dundalk's church of St Nicholas.
 It was the situation in Ireland which first prompted FitzRalph to develop
 his own particular theory of dominion and law. FitzRalph ruled a culturally
 divided diocese. To the north was the ecclesia inter Hibernos, Gaelic-speaking
 and adhering to traditional law, land tenure and social customs. To the south
 was the ecclesia inter Anglos, dominated by Anglo-Norman settlers who ob
 served the common law.8 His cathedral lay in the ecclesia inter Hibernos and
 had a Gaelic dean and chapter. However, he resided in the south at his two
 manors, Termonfechin and Dromiskin, and the parish church of St Peter at
 Drogheda acted as pro-cathedral. There was a history of tension between the
 two ecclesiae, especially in FitzRalph's youth, during the invasion of Edward
 Bruce in 1315-18. Among the gravamina presented to Pope Clement V at the
 Council of Vienne, around 1318, was a complaint that it was not regarded as a
 crime for an Englishman to deprive an Irishman of his property or even to take
 his life, something which FitzRalph would roundly condemn in his sermons
 some forty years later.9 However, FitzRalph would also accuse Franciscans of
 Gaelic origin within his diocese of abusing the confessional in order to excuse
 similar crimes committed against the English colonists. In a sermon given at
 the Carmelite church in Drogheda, on 25 March 1349, FitzRalph denounced
 the virtual civil war between the English and the Irish in the archdiocese and
 the climate of general theft and dishonesty. He pointed out to his hearers (who
 were all presumably Anglici, and had been recently stricken by Black Death)
 that the rival communities were under the impression that it was lawful not
 only to rob and plunder someone of the other community but even to kill
 them.10 FitzRalph reminded them that killing was justified only as self
 defence, and that, in cases of theft, full restitution was necessary. He con
 demned the manner in which racial tensions were used as a pretext for self
 interest and greed. Again, in a sermon given at Dundalk on 3 April 1356, he
 fulminated against those who destroyed his peace efforts and took the law into
 their own hands, on the grounds that they were acting according to the lex
 marchie of their forefathers. He had tried under a royal commission to make a
 8 See J. A. Watt, The Church and the Two Nations In Medieval Ireland (Cambridge, 1970); 'Ecclesia
 inter Anglos et inter Hibernos: confrontation and coexistence in the medieval diocese of Armagh' in The
 English in Medieval Ireland, Proceedings of the first joint meeting of the Royal Irish Academy and the
 British Academy, ed. J. Lydon (Dublin 1984), pp 46-64; 'The Church and the Two Nations in Late
 Medieval Armagh' in The Churches, Ireland and the Irish, Studies in Church History 25, eds W. J.
 Shiels and D. Wood (Oxford, 1987), pp 37-54. See also K. Walsh, 'One Church and Two Nations: a
 uniquely Irish Phenomenon?' in Faith and Identity: Christian Political Experience, Studies in Church
 History, Subsidia 9, eds D. Loades and K. Walsh (Oxford, 1990), pp 81-91. K. Simms, 'Frontiers in
 the Irish Church - regional and cultural' in T. Barry, R. Frame and K. Simms (eds) Colony and
 Frontier in Medieval Ireland - Essays presented to James E Lydon (London and Rio Grande, 1995), pp
 176-200. 9 See Walsh, A fourteenth-century scholar and primate, pp 9-10. 10 See Walsh, A fourteenth
 century scholar and primate, pp 325, 342.
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 truce in August of 1348, and some six years later he tried again to make peace
 with the O'Neill. He commented that while he could make peace with the
 leaders, their supporters would not agree and would not observe the truce.11
 For Fitzralph, the seizure of land, on a legal pretext which might be valid
 per iudicium legis terrenae, was still a violence of the law of conscience and the
 law of God. This led him to raise an argument which he would later develop
 in the De Pauperie Salvatoris, namely that while the civil courts judged on the
 apparent visible realities and, due to limited information, could make a false
 judgment, nevertheless, falsum iudicium numqum transfert vere dominium. But
 how far was such a doctrine practicable in the circumstances of the time? His
 fulminations were directed primarily at his own Anglo-Norman kinfolk whom
 he blamed more than his Gaelic subjects. Like most of his educated medieval
 contemporaries, Fitzralph had high ideals regarding the Christian common
 wealth, but he was a realist. St Thomas, for example, accepted that it was not
 the task of the state to make laws to compel people to be virtuous and that
 certain imperfection had to be tolerated for the sake of the greater good,
 freedom.12 FitzRalph agreed. In a sermon preached at Drogheda, on 2 Decem
 ber 1352, he again applied his theory of dominion and law but accepted that,
 for social reasons and the common good, hidden wrongs might have to be
 tolerated.13 This is a clear indication that while his theory of dominion laid
 claim to eternal validity it could not always be enforced under positive law.
 FitzRalph reveals that he underwent a conversion to the truth of scripture
 that led him to dislike Aristotelianism.14 The latter he shared with Nicholas of
 Autrecourt, who on 20 May 1346 was censured for his views.15 Nicholas had
 ii See Walsh, A fourteenth-century scholar and primate, pp 340-1. 12, See, for example, Summa
 theologiae (henceforth S. Th), II II, q. 78, a. 1, co.: Human laws leave some sins unpunished because of
 the imperfection of men who would lack many things that are useful to them if all sins were strictly
 prohibited by the application of legal penalties. Therefore human law allows usury not because
 it considers it to be just but to avoid interference with the useful activities of many people.
 13 See Walsh, A fourteenth-century scholar and primate, p. 325. 14 See the autobiographical prayer
 edited by L. L. Hammerich, The Beginnings of the Strife between Richard FitzRalph and the Mendicants
 (Copenhagen, 1938) p. 20. It seems that FitzRalph underwent a conversion during the six years that
 he spent at the papal court (c. 1337-43). The text as translated in W. A. Pantin, The English Church in
 the Fourteenth Century (Cambridge, 1955), pp 132-3, reads as follows: 'Nor were You, the Solid Truth,
 absent from me in those six years, but, in Your Holy Scriptures you shone upon me as in a certain
 radiant mirror; whereas in my former years, in the trifles of the philosophers, you had been hidden
 from me as in a certain dark cloud. For previously, I used to think that through the teachings of
 Aristotle and certain argumentations that were profound only to men profound in vanity, I used to
 think that I had penetrated to the depths of Your Truth, with the citizens of Your Heaven; until You,
 the Solid Truth, shone upon me in Your Scriptures, scattering the cloud of my error, and showing me
 how I was croaking in the marshes with the toads and frogs. For until I had You the Truth to lead me,
 I had heard, but did not understand, the tumult of the philosophers chattering against You, the per
 tinacious Jews, the proud Greeks, the carnal Saracens, and the unlearned Armenians ... At last,
 O Solid Truth, You so shone on me from above, that I burned to seize and to hold You, the Truth,
 Jesus promised to us in the Law and Prophets. And when in the turmoil of lawsuits a certain spell of
 serenity had smiled upon me, I sought You in Your sacred Scriptures, intimately and importunately,
 not only by reading, but also with prayer, until You came to meet me joyously in Your ways'.
 15 Nicholas of Autrecourt (?-.1295-1369) was summoned by Pope Benedict XII to Avignon from Paris
 on 21 November 1340 to respond to allegations that he was teaching erroneous doctrines. He was
 convicted in 1346 by the papal commissions of Pope Clement VI and Cardinal Curti and four lists
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 argued for common sense and for attention to realities rather than to the
 arguments of Aristotle and Averroes. For his part FitzRalph spent the latter
 years of his life defending a thesis of lordship and jurisdiction based on a
 perhaps questionable interpretation of Augustinian doctrine, and one that was
 radically opposed to the principles of Aristotelianism.
 With the publication of his dialogue, the De pauperie Salvatoris of 1356,
 FitzRalph made known to a wider audience his teaching on dominion or
 lordship based on grace. This work was to have far-reaching consequences in
 the later writings of Wyclif and Hus. Indeed, Wyclif s contemporaries were
 well aware that his source was FitzRalph, although Wyclif himself developed
 the implications of the Irishman's teaching in a way that the latter would not
 have condoned and seems not to have envisaged.
 FitzRalph rarely mentions any authority for his view and cited only those
 who opposed it. There is no allusion to dominium in the commentary on the
 Sentences. Indeed we have to wait until the Summa de quaestionibus
 Armenorum (1340-41, Book X, ch. 4), where he writes:
 So far as I can judge no man in a state of mortal sin has true lordship
 over other creatures in God's sight. He ought rather to be called a tyrant,
 a thief or a robber, though he may keep the name of prince or lord, by
 reason of possession or hereditary succession, or the approval of the
 people who are subject to him, or by some other human law. But he has
 no true lordship until he repents, and until the grace of penance has
 restored him to a state that is acceptable to God.16
 The late Aubrey Gwynn S.J. traced this doctrine back to some members of
 the Augustinian school, particularly to Giles of Rome, who put forward an
 extreme interpretation of De civitate Dei in 1302 at the height of the dispute
 between Boniface VIII and Philip the Fair in his De ecclesiasticapotestateF The
 containing a total of sixty-six erroneous propositions were drawn up. Autrecourt foimally recanted
 before 19 May 1346 and in November 1347, at a meeting of the masters of the University of Paris at the
 Church of St Mathurin, he publicly burned the lists of propositions and his treatise Exigit ordo (or the
 Tractatus Universalis). Autrecourt's principal error lay in his having rejected the concepts of substance
 and cause, which lay at the foundations of medieval metaphysics and epistemology. He concluded that
 we have no certainty regarding the material world and all that was left was a knowledge of the self.
 His form of scepticism is seen as anticipating similar doubts raised by David Hume in the eighteenth
 century. On the life and thought of Autrecourt, see M. Beuchot, 'Nicholas of Autrecourt' in A Com
 panion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Oxford, 2003), pp 458-65. It provides an up-to-date biblio
 graphy. 16 Quoted in A. Gwynn, The English Austin Friars in the Time of Wyclif (London, 1940), pp
 59-73, especially p. 67. Gwynn's source is Johannes Sudoris's edition of the Summa de Erroribus
 Armenorum (Paris, 1514), p. 75V. 17 See A. Gwynn, The English Austin Friars in the Time ofWyclif pp
 60-61. See also Aegidius Romanus, De ecclesiastica potestate (ed. R. Scholz, Weimar 1929). There is an
 English translation in R. W. Dyson, Giles of Rome on Ecclesiastical Power. The De ecclesiastica potestate
 of Aegidius Romanus (Woodbridge, 1986). See also C. Luna 'Un nuovo documento del conflitto
 tra Bonifacio VII e Filippo il Bello: il discorso "De potentia domini pape" di Egidio Romano' in
 Document! e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 3 (1992), pp 167-243, 491-559. For a recent
 assessment, see J. Miethke, De potestate papae. Die papstliche Amtskompetenz im Widerstreit der
 politischen Theorie von Thomas von Aquin bis Wilhelm von Ockham (Tubingen, 2000) (Spatmittelalter
 und Reformation, Neue Reihe 16), pp 94-101.
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 irony is that a theory which was developed to defend the hierocratic claims of
 the papacy would be used within the space of three generations to attack papal
 jurisdiction, as we shall see below.
 Giles had argued that all lordship existed with justice only under and
 through the Church. From him only the faithful members of the Church
 enjoyed just and righteous lordship. Thus, justice was lacking in all those who,
 either through sin or lack of baptismal regeneration, were without grace. From
 this it followed that original and mortal sin deprived both the sinner and the
 infidel from all rights to lordship, jurisdiction and property.
 Guglielmo Amidani of Cremona, Augustinian prior general (1326), was one
 of the theologians appointed by Pope John XXII to examine the Defensor Pads
 of Marsilius of Padua, against which Guglielmo composed his own Refutatio
 Errorum. He used the arguments of Giles to prove the potestas directa of the
 spiritual power, i.e. that there is no temporal authority without spiritual power.
 As Katherine Walsh points out, it is significant that such an anti-Thomist and
 anti-Aristotelian doctrine could receive a favourable reception at the papal
 court so soon after the canonisation of St Thomas in 1323.18 Guglielmo was
 also present at the papal court at the time of John XXII's successor, Benedict
 XII, who was a friend of Grandisson, FitzRalph's patron. Thus he moved in
 similar circles to FitzRalph, and the Irishman may have derived the doctrine
 directly from him.
 FitzRalph's Proposicio of 5 July 1350 stated his belief that Gods grace was the
 foundation of valid lordship and the exercise of authority and jurisdiction; the
 corollary being that those who abused such rights and principles deserved to
 be deprived of them. His target here, just as later, was the Franciscan order.19
 According to Firzralph, the Franciscans falsely claimed to live a life which was
 evangelica atque perfecta. He argued that they had transferred civil ownership
 of their property to the pope, thus giving themselves greater security, rather
 than using their property for the poor. Thus, they had sinned and abused their
 position and should be stripped of the privileges which the popes had mis
 takenly conferred on them.
 In De Pauperie Salvatoris FitzRalph argues that positive laws were made
 necessary because of sin, i.e. in order to repress evil. Indeed, in an ideal society
 the function of civil lordship would be superfluous. Before the Fall all tem
 poral possessions would have been in common; private property had been
 introduced into the world only as a result of sin. In Book IV he argued that a
 man in the state of mortal sin lost his lordship over temporal goods. Yet
 FitzRalph never suggested that the Church or the civil authorities should con
 fiscate anyone's goods, Wyclif would pursue this notion further, suggesting,
 like the Donatists of old, that a sinful priest could not validly carry out the
 18 See Walsh, A fourteenth-century scholar and primate, p. 383. 19 See J. Coleman, 'FitzRalph's
 Antimendicant proposicio (1350) and the Politics of the Papal Court at Avignon in The Journal of
 Ecclesiastical History, 35 (1984), pp 376-90.
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 functions of his office. The Augustinian friar Geoffrey Hardeby made this
 precise point against FitzRalph.
 FitzRalph, it seems, never considered the practical implications of his doc
 trine outside of the context of the mendicant controversy. He did, however,
 argue that grace alone entitled a person to lordship over temporal things. As
 one historian has put it, the consequences of FitzRalphs theory were that since
 the title to exercise office and authority, as well as the enjoyment of property,
 was to be a subjective one, i.e. being in a state of grace, no-one, be he prelate,
 king, judge or merchant, could exercise functions implicit in his office or
 profession by virtue of election, appointment or consecration, or by virtue of
 inheritance, purchase, licence or charter.
 It was a doctrine which was able to unmake popes, to trample episcop
 acy underfoot, to mutilate monasticism - the rights of sons to inherit, or
 labourers to their wage could be subjected to the same criteria - a further
 conclusion, which FitzRalph was careful to avoid but which was de
 duced from his dialogue both by a mendicant opponent and by Wyclif
 and the Lollards, concerned the effectiveness of the sacraments when
 administered by a sinful priest: no-one could be sure that they were not
 in a state of original sin for want of effective baptism, no woman could
 be sure that she was lawfully married; there could be no assurance of
 legitimacy, none that the sacrament of the altar was effectively per
 formed; orders would be in doubt, absolution a conjecture, and extreme
 unction a gamble.20
 It took Wyclif, Hus and Jerome of Prague, as well as the commission
 appointed by the Council Fathers at the Council of Constance (1414-17), who
 examined these views, to reach a precise formulation of the dangers implicit in
 FitzRalphs doctrines.
 John Wyclif is a crucial figure in the development of this dispute in Fitz
 Ralphs wake.21 He was born in Yorkshire around 1330 and educated at Oxford,
 becoming a doctor of divinity in 1372. In 1374, King Edward III appointed
 him rector of Lutterworth, and later made him part of a deputation to meet at
 Brussels with a papal deputation. About this time Wyclif began to argue for
 'dominion founded on grace'. By 'dominion he meant both the right to
 exercise authority in church or state and the right to own property. He main
 tained that these rights were given to men directly from God, and that they
 2,o R. R. Betts, 'Richard FitzRalph, Archbishop of Armagh, and the Doctrine of Dominion' in H. A.
 Cronne, T. W Moody and D. B. Quinn (eds), Essays in British and Irish History in Honour of James
 Eadie Todd (London, 1949), pp 46-60; pp 50-51. Cited in Walsh, A fourteenth-century scholar and
 primate, p. 405. 21 Wyclif's indebtedness to FitzRalph was already recognized by R. Lane Poole in his
 1890 edition of WycliPs De dominio divino [Wyclif Society Publications, no. 14] (London 1890), to
 which he appended the first four books of FitzRalph's De pauperie salvatoris. On the relationship
 between FitzRalph's thought and that of Wyclif, see J. A. Robson, Wyclif and the Oxford Schools
 [Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, New Series, vol. VIIl] (Cambridge, 1966). See
 chapter three, 'Richard FitzRalph and the Conservative Tradition', pp 70-96.
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 were not given or continued apart from sanctifying grace. Thus, a man in a
 state of mortal sin could not lawfully function as an official of Church or state,
 nor could he lawfully own property. He argued that the Church had fallen into
 sin and that it ought therefore to give up all its property, and that the clergy
 should live in complete poverty. This disendowment was to be carried out by
 the king.22 From 1376 to 1378 Wyclif was a clerical advisor to John of Gaunt,
 who effectively governed England until his nephew, Richard II, came of age in
 1381. It is not clear what influence either man had on the other, but it is con
 jectured that John of Gaunt, who had his own reasons for opposing the wealth
 and power of the clergy, may have used a naive Wyclif as his tool. In 1377, king
 and parliament solicited his judgement on whether it was lawful to withhold
 traditional payments from Rome. He replied that it was. Pope Gregory XI
 issued five bulls against him, but without effect. WycliPs last political act was
 performed in 1378, when he argued that criminals who had taken sanctuary in
 churches rnight lawfully be arrested.23
 From retirement in Lutterworth Wyclif published a series of attacks on
 corruption in the Church. In 1381 came the Peasants' Revolt. It is unlikely that
 Wyclif s teachings, which circulated chiefly among the learned, had any role in
 instigating the revolt, but the fact that many peasants set out to put to death
 all landlords, lay and clerical alike, made Wyclif's 'dominion founded on grace'
 look dangerous. Hence his intellectual tendency was bloodily suppressed along
 with the Revolt itself. In 1382, all of his writings were banned. In that year
 Wyclif suffered a stroke, and on 31 December 1384 a second stroke killed him.
 After his death, his opponents had him condemned for heresy, and in 1428 his
 body was removed from consecrated ground.
 Wyclif's view of dominion and grace depended on FitzRalph's theory
 according to which the original lordship was independent of natural and civil
 circumstances. It is a particular application of Wyclif's general views on elec
 tion and damnation. The three main theses of the first book of his De civili
 dominio (1375-6) were
 1. A man in sin has no right to dominion;
 2. A man who is in a state of grace possesses all the goods of the world;
 3. As a consequence, there can be no dominion without grace as its formal
 cause.
 Wyclif defines dominion as the right to exercise authority and, indirectly, to
 hold property. A man in the state of grace is lord of the visible universe, which
 he shares with all other men in the state of grace. Since private property is the
 result of sin, all goods should be held in common, as was the case, he argued,
 before the Fall. In his prelapsarian state Adam enjoyed original lordship or the
 22 See S.E. Lahey, 'Wyclif on Rights' in Journal of the History of Ideas 58 (1997), pp 1-20. See also
 M. Wilks, 'Predestination, Property and Power: Wyclif s Theory of Domination and Grace' in Studies
 in Church History, 2 (1965), pp 220?36. 23 On Wyclif's life and writings, see Dictionnaire de theologie
 catholique, vol. XV, pp 3585-614; R. Sharpe, A Handlist of Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland
 before IS40 (Brepols, 1997), pp 347-54.
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 lordship of an uncorrupted nature. Gospel lordship was a partial restoration of
 this original lordship. Civil lordship differed from both original and gospel
 lordship in being coercive and in making use of private property.24 Wyclif
 further argued that the best form of government was monarchy. Kings had to
 be obeyed and taxes paid to them, even if they became tyrants, since they were
 God's vicars whom He alone could depose. Thus it was secular lordship only
 that was justified in the world. Wyclif's doctrine of grace-founded dominium
 required the king to be a moral exemplar, that he wage only just war, that
 he keep laws and taxes to a minimum and that he protect a possession-less
 Church. However, Wyclif's political theory was anti-authoritarian, inasmuch
 as no civil dominium, including both property ownership and civil juris
 diction, could be granted in perpetuity. Again, Wyclif was anti-feudal in that
 he held that biological, hereditary succession did not confer dominium.
 These problems achieved temporary closure in the Middle Ages with the
 declarations of the Council of Constance which condemned Wyclif's teaching
 on dominium. Hus was burnt as a heretic and Wyclif's bones taken out of
 hallowed ground. FitzRalph, however, escaped censure. By the sixteenth cen
 tury, the idea that grace might entitle one to rule over those who were not in a
 state of grace began to have a new use, namely that of justifying the occu
 pation of the territories of the New World and the deposition of native rulers.
 The notion in Roman law of res nullius could be appealed to in order to justify
 the acquisition, through occupation, of uninhabited territories, but it was
 difficult to apply in countries inhabited by people organised into a political
 society. One wonders what the natives made of the English general Sir
 Humphrey Gilbert, who, when he took possession of the harbour of St John
 in Newfoundland in 1583, promulgated three laws making the Church of
 England the official church, setting out a crime of high treason for anything
 attempted against the possession of these territories and a second for slander
 against Elizabeth I.
 What in effect was at stake was the right to territorial sovereignty of the
 native peoples against the counterclaims to world government of the European
 states. The latter derived from Roman claims to possession over all the earth.
 Long after the fall of the empire, as European travellers 'discovered' new terri
 tories and annexed them, they clung to the Roman idea that they were bring
 ing these new lands into the 'known' world. Thus, when Colombus discovered
 the New World, he believed that he had brought the populations of the
 Americas into the light and the world. For him, the native populations were
 not entitled to the same rights enjoyed by Europeans.
 The claims of the Spanish overseas empire were based on two interlocking
 claims to universal authority: the first derived from the pope in the Bulls of
 24 See A. S. McGrade, J. Kilcullen and M. Kemshall (eds), The Cambridge Translations of Medieval
 Philosophical Texts, Vol. II: Ethics and Political Philosophy (Cambridge, 2001), particularly chapter 17
 'John Wyclif on Lordship' (Selections), pp 587-654, p. 589.
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 Donation of 1493, which granted sovereignty of everything in the Atlantic and
 which was based on the universalism of the Christian religion;25 the second
 claim was that the Holy Roman Emperor had a de iure right to universal
 rule.26 It followed that, though he might not actually rule over all of the
 peoples 'discovered and yet to be discovered', he had the right to. The first
 rejection of the imperial claim came with the writings of the Spanish
 theologian, Francisco de Vitoria (c. 1485-1546)
 De Vitoria was one of the most influential political theorists in sixteenth
 century Catholic Europe. He was a theologian by profession and someone for
 whom theology, as the queen of the sciences,' covered all domains, including
 jurisprudence. He spent most of his life as a university professor at Paris and
 Salamanca. While at Paris, he attended lectures by the Flemish theologian
 Peter Crockaert, who was the first there to substitute the text of the Summa
 theologiae for the Sentences of Peter Lombard. De Vitoria would later do the
 same at Salamanca. It was there that he formed two generations of Spanish
 theologians and jurists including Luis de Molina (1535-1600) and Francisco
 Suarez (1548-1617). He was instrumental in the renewal of scholastic thought
 that earned the school of Salamanca its reputation and fuelled the Second
 Scholasticism.
 The most pressing issue in contemporary politics during de Vitoria's time
 was the legitimisation of the Spanish conquest of the New World. This debate
 began when King Ferdinand appointed a commission of theologians and
 lawyers to discuss the matter in 1513. The problem became acute, however,
 with the discovery and conquest of Mexico in 1520-22 and Peru in 1531-32.
 The invasion and virtual destruction of great empires raised questions. In his
 lectures on the Summa in 1534-35, de Vitoria argued that coercion could only
 be used when crimes that went against nature, such as human sacrifice and
 cannibalism, were committed. Intervention was justified only because such
 acts were harmful to our neighbours and because the 'defense of our neigh
 bours is the rightful concern of each of us'.27
 De Vitoria repeated the main points of Aquinas s teaching on natural law.
 However, the former applied the notion of the knowability of first principles
 of the moral order to all rational beings in order to argue for a basis for
 international agreement, the famous ius gentium. This law of nations was a
 term which served to indicate those laws which embodied a set of precepts
 enacted by the power of 'the whole world, which is in a sense a common
 wealth' irrespective of local legislative concerns, beliefs, customs of individual
 communities, or indeed their place in time.
 25 See A. Pagden, 'Shadows on an unquier sleep: America and the competing discourses of European
 Universalism', paper delivered to 1997 CUNY Renaissance Studies Conference entitled 'Early Modern
 Trans-Atlantic Encounters: England, Spain and the Americas' available on-line at http://
 web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/renai/conf/Papers/Keynote/Pagden.htm. 16 Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio de
 Indiis {On the American Indians), q. 2, a. 2. See Fransisco de Vitoria, Political Writings, edited by
 A. Pagden and J. Lawrance, (Cambridge, 1991), pp xxiv, 260-61. 27 Francisco de Vitoria, Political
 Writings, p. xxiii.
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 For de Vitoria (though not explicitly for Aquinas) international law was an
 essential part of positive law, but since it was meant to apply to all peoples it
 had to be closer to the precepts of natural law. The contentious issues of de
 Vitoria's time were the nature of civil power and kingship, the power of the
 papacy and the question of the legitimacy of the European expansion into the
 Americas. With regard to the latter, de Vitoria argued that non-Europeans had
 rights and protection under the ius gentium and were subject to no other posi
 tive law than their own. It was de Vitoria's observations on the implications of
 this and his questioning of the legitimacy of the Spanish invasion of America
 which led to his maintaining that there are principles of natural justice which
 are applicable to all human beings.
 De Vitoria sought to reinforce Aquinas's arguments that all rights (turd)
 were natural and were (ultimately) the consequences of God's eternal law and
 not a matter of God's grace, or divine (revealed) law. Aquinas had written
 Here we must consider that dominion and government are matters of
 human law, while the distinction between believers and non-believers is
 a matter of divine law. Now the divine law which is based on grace does
 not abolish human law which is based on reason. Therefore, the mere
 fact of a difference between believers and unbelievers does not abolish
 dominion or government by unbelievers over believers.28
 And again
 The order of justice is not abolished but rather confirmed by faith . . .
 The order of justice requires that inferiors obey their superiors, for
 otherwise stability could not be maintained in human affairs. Therefore,
 the Christian faith does not exempt the faithful from obeying secular
 rulers.29
 He held that unbelievers should in no way be forced to believe, for faith, he
 said, was a matter of the will.30 Further he insisted that all men are equal by
 nature' and all should have some part in government'.31 The contrasting claim,
 as we have seen, was made by Wycliff and Hus and, in de Vitoria's own time,
 by the Lutherans, to the effect that rights, and hence the authority of secular
 rulers, were dependent on God's grace. Thus, if a ruler was a heretic or a sinner
 his laws could not be binding in conscience: only a righteous ruler could be a
 just legislator. An unrighteous ruler could be deposed and such unrighteous'
 included unbelievers.
 What is interesting is that de Vitoria correctly traces the doctrine to its
 source in Richard FitzRalph. FitzRalph, as we have seen, argued that dominium
 or lordship of the world belonged properly only to God and that he admitted
 man to a share of his dominium out of grace. Hence only those who enjoy his
 x8 S. Th., II Ilae, q. 10, a. 10. Z9 S. Th., Ila Ilae, q. 104, a. 6. 30 5. Th., Ha Ilae, q. 10, a. 6. 31 S. 77?.,
 Ha Ilae, q. 104, a. 5; Iallae q. 105, a. 1.
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 grace share his dominium. De Vitoria refers specifically to FitzRalph in a number
 of places throughout his works. In On the Civil Power (1528), q. 1, a. 6, he asks if
 non-Christians have legitimate sovereigns. He states
 Richard FitzRalph, archbishop of Armagh, a man of otherwise blameless
 character and intelligence, certainly argues in his De pauperitate Saluatoris
 that not merely unbelief but any mortal sin impedes any kind of power
 or dominion {dominium) or jurisdiction, either public or private, in the
 mistaken belief that the true title and foundation of all power is grace.
 Nevertheless, the authorities and arguments which he adduces to try to
 prove this assertion are so weak and unworthy of consideration for the
 solution of this problem that I shall not waste my time over them. To
 this one may therefore answer that there can be no doubt at all that non
 believers have legitimate rulers and masters.32
 Now Roman law made a distinction between possessio (the control of a thing
 irrespective of whether a possessor has a right to it or not) and dominium (the
 right to a thing, irrespective of whether the owner has control over it or not).
 De Vitoria fought against the notion of dominium through grace (it was
 condemned later at the Council of Trent) because it could be used to argue
 that the peoples of the 'New World' merely had control over their lands and
 not a right to them because they were unbelievers. Thus, Christians would be
 entitled to take the lands, wealth and property from the native Americans
 because Christians can and should exercise dominium over all unbelievers and
 over the whole world. This, of course, would render natural rights, or those
 which belong to human beings precisely because they are human, null and
 void. It was natural law theory that enabled de Vitoria to argue against this
 position.
 In his first relectio}^ On the American Indians (given in 1539, published in 1557),
 de Vitoria pointed out that
 This whole dispute and relectio has risen again because of these bar
 barians in the New World, commonly called Indians, who came under
 the power of the Spaniards some forty years ago, having been previously
 unknown to our world. . . . My present discussion of these people will
 be divided into three parts: first, by what right were the barbarians
 subjected to Spanish rule? Second, what powers have the Spanish mon
 archy over the Indians in temporal and civil matters? And third, what
 powers has either the monarchy or the Church with regard to the
 Indians in spiritual and religious matters?34
 32- Francisco de Vitoria, De potestate civili {On the Civil Power) q. I, a. 6. See Political Writings op.cit.,
 p. 18. 33 De Vitoria gave lectures on Aquinas's Summa theologiae and the Sentences of Peter Lombard
 but these were continuous commentaries upon set texts, as was the tradition. The relectiones, or 're
 reading', allowed the teacher to focus upon particular problems arising from the text or to deal with
 matters of contemporary interest. 34 Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio De Indiis, prooemium {Political
 Writings, p. 233).
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 He questions whether the treatment of the native Americans by the Spaniards
 is in keeping with justice and unwittingly echoes the concerns of FitzRalph
 some two centuries before:
 But when we hear subsequently of bloody massacres and of innocent
 individuals pillaged of their possessions and dominions, there are grounds
 for doubting the justice of what has been done.35
 He asks whether these barbarians, before the arrival of the Spaniards, had true
 dominion, public and private' (q. I, a. i) (i.e. did they have rights of owner
 ship?).36 And he raises the question, 'whether there existed among them any
 men who were true princes and masters of the others'.37 He says
 If the barbarians were not true masters before the arrival of the
 Spaniards, it can only have been on four possible grounds . . . These four
 grounds are that they were either sinners, unbelievers, madmen or
 irrational.38
 He then proceeds to argue that 'mortal sin is no impediment to the civil right
 of ownership nor to true dominion'39 and 'it is no impediment for a man to be
 a true master, that he is an unbeliever.40 He adds that 'the barbarians are not
 impeded from being true masters, publicly or privately, either by mortal sin or
 by the particular fault of unbelief'.41 He goes on to say
 The conclusion of all that has been said is that the barbarians un
 doubtedly possessed as true dominion, both public and private, as any
 Christians. That is to say, they could not be robbed of their property,
 either as private citizens or as princes, on the grounds that they were not
 true masters. It would be harsh to deny to them, who have never done us
 any wrong, the rights we concede to Saracens and Jews . . . ,42
 In 1510, the Scottish Dominican John Mair had suggested that the American
 Indians might be slaves by nature. The origin of such a doctrine was attributed
 to Aristotle in the Politics (I and III), who suggested that there might be
 groups of barbarians who were not fully capable of understanding and so of
 directing their actions in a proper manner. As such they could not have exer
 cised dominium before the conquests, since they would not have been able to
 live in civil society. De Vitoria rejected these claims, on the grounds that the
 Indians did in fact have an order in their affairs. They lived in cities, had a
 35 Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio De Indiis, prooemium (Political Writings, p. 238). 36 Francisco de
 Vitoria, Relectio De Indiis, q. 1, a. 1 (Political Writings, p. 239). 37 Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio De
 Indiis, q. 1, a. 1 (Political Writings, p. 239). 38 Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio De Indiis, q. 1, a. 1
 (Political Writings, p. 240). 39 Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio De Indiis, q. 1, a. 2 (Political Writings, p.
 241). 40 Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio De Indiis, q. 1, a. 3 (Political Writings, p. 244). 41 Francisco de
 Vitoria, Relectio De Indiis, q. i, a. 3 (Political Writings, p. 246). 4% Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio De
 Indiis, q. 1, concl. (Political Writings, p. 251).
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 recognised form of marriage, magistrates, overlords, laws, industries, and com
 merce, all of which require the use of reason'.43
 De Vitoria then went on to consider various reasons that have been put forward
 to excuse the Spaniards for taking possession of Indian land and property. In
 question 2 he rules out a series of unjust titles that, it was claimed, might empower
 Christians to take possession of the property of the barbarians.
 The first unjust title (q. 2, a. 1) which de Vitoria examines is that our most
 serene Emperor (Charles V) might be master of the whole world'. This is re
 jected as without foundation on the grounds that the emperor is not the
 master of the whole world. He is not master of the world by any law, natural,
 divine or human.44 The second unjust title examined (q. 2, a. 2) is that the just
 possession of these countries is on behalf of the supreme pontiff. 'Those who
 defend this title - and it has energetic supporters - assert that the pope is
 monarch of the whole world, even in temporals, and consequently that he was
 empowered to constitute the kings of Spain as kings and lords of those lands.'
 De Vitoria rejects this argument, asserting that the Pope does not possess juris
 diction over other nations except in spiritual matters. Following Aquinas,45 de
 Vitoria acknowledged the right of the Pope to intervene in secular matters
 when these touch upon spiritual concerns, such as the waging of war, peace
 treaties and the salvation of souls. This, however, is far from asserting the direct
 subjugation of temporal powers to the spiritual, or that Pope Alexander VI had
 the authority to grant possession of these new lands in the Bulls of Donation.
 Since the pope's right to intervene in secular matters was limited to spiritual
 concerns, he lacked power both spiritual and temporal over non-believers and
 could not confiscate their lands as a punishment for sins. The third unjust title
 (q. 2, a. 3) concerns the notion that the possession of these countries is by right of
 discovery. The argument is that 'the Spaniards, who were the first to discover and
 occupy these countries, must by right possess them, just as if they had discovered a
 hitherto uninhabited island'. But this is a false claim because, as de Vitoria has
 already shown, the Indians already possessed 'true public and private dominion'.46
 These lands were already in their ownership. The fourth unjust title (q. 2, a. 4) rests
 on the claim that they refuse to accept the faith of Christ. De Vitoria rejects this
 argument as inadequate. 'It is not sufficiently clear to me that the Christian faith
 has up to now been announced and set before the barbarians in such a way as to
 43 Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio De Indiis, q. i, a. 6 {Political Writings, p. xxv; 250). 44 Francisco de
 Vitoria, Relectio De Indiis, q. 2, a. 1 {Political Writings, p. 253). 45 See, S. Th. Ha Ilae, q. 60, a. 6: The
 secular power is subject to the spiritual power as the body is .subject to the soul. Therefore the power
 to judge is not usurped if a spiritual authority enters into temporal affairs in matters in which the
 secular power is subject to it or which have been given to it by the secular power. Again, Thomas
 writes in his Commentary on the Sentences, II, dist. 44, q. 2: Both the spiritual and rhe secular powers
 are derived from the power of God. Therefore, the secular power is only under the spiritual power to
 the extent intended by God, namely, in the matters that relate to the salvation of souls. Therefore, in
 these matters the spiritual power is to be obeyed rather than the temporal. In those matters that
 pertain to the good of civil society the secular power is to be obeyed rather than
 the spiritual .... 46 Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio De Indiis, q. 2, a. 3 {Political Writings, p. 264).
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 oblige them to believe it. ... I have not heard of any miracles or signs, nor of any
 exemplary saintliness of life sufficient to convert them. On the contrary, I hear
 only of provocations, savage crimes, and multitudes of unholy acts'.47
 Thus, it would seem that de Vitoria echoes the concerns of FitzRalph, even
 if he does not agree with the Irishman's principles. In Question 3 de Vitoria
 turns to possibly just titles by which the Indians passed under the rule of the
 Spaniards. In doing so, he begins the process of working out what we might
 call international rights, covering freedom of travel, trade and religion. It has
 been argued that de Vitoria was here establishing a law of nations, which would
 become the international law, not just of Christian states, but of the whole
 world.
 Claims to world empire were also dismissed by de Vitoria's pupil Domingo
 de Soto, who argued that civil power could only be transferred by society act
 ing as a body. For a universal empire to be possible, it would be necessary to
 call a general assembly of the whole world. This was hardly feasible. In his De
 iustitia et iure of 1556 de Soto made a rather imaginative use of the Aristotelian
 principle that something can only grow to the extent that is set for it by
 nature. Thus, human government also has its natural limits: one state cannot
 rule the whole world. A universal or global rule would be neither natural nor
 legitimate. Given that all peoples are different from one another, each must be
 governed according to its own needs, local customs and local rulers. He further
 noted that all civil power depended on voluntary submission to a ruler who
 was elected' by the people. Civil power derived its legitimacy from custom.
 Thus, empires rise and fall; the power of one country cannot and should not
 extend to the whole world.48
 Despite the defence of the rights of non-Christian peoples to individual
 sovereignty by these Thomists, as we know the history of the New World
 turned out to be rather different. European nations used a variety of tactics in
 order to lay claims to these new' lands: symbolic acts such as the planting of
 flags; discovery understood as conferring inchoate title, to be completed by
 occupation within a reasonable time; treaties with the indigenous populations,
 whereby their lands were purchased from them; treating these lands as res
 nullius in cases where they were not occupied already by other Europeans;
 falling back on just war theory when native populations resisted. In general,
 the Spanish and Portuguese appealed to papal documents and treaties to
 enforce their claims and justified their occupation as serving the purposes of
 conversion. For the English of this period, however
 The law of Nature and nations had acquired in England a new meaning.
 A new interpretation was placed upon it in accordance with Protestant
 thought and English interests. The sovereignty of the native races was
 ignored, a decided, though unconscious tribute to the genius of Wycliffe.
 47 Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio De Indiis, q. 2, concl. (Political Writings, p. 271). 48 The opposition
 to the idea of one world empire is also found in Augustine, De civitate Dei, IV, 15.
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 Discovery followed by settlement, thus leading to occupation, or, more
 rarely, the simple right of conquest, was relied on as a title.49
 FitzRalph would probably have disapproved this development of his original
 notion of dominion. A principle which he intended to bring some measure of
 justice into law in his own diocese was later used to support laws without
 principle on the international stage.
 49 J- Holland Rose, A. R Newton, and E. A. Benians (eds), The Cambridge History of the British
 Empire, Vol. i, Chapter six, 'International Law and the Outer World, 1450-1648', p. 193.
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